Abstract-A new ID-based group signature scheme, in which group managers and group members are all ID-based, is presented in this paper. Our scheme is obtained by using a new way to the construction of group signature schemes and based on an ID-based signature scheme from bilinear pairing. Due to the nice and simple constructive method and the sound properties of bilinear pairing, it is shown that the proposed scheme is very simple and practical and has the advantages of concurrent join, immediate revocation, easy tracing and short signature length. The security analysis is also under the formal security notion of an ID-based group signature scheme.
I. INTRODUCTION
A group signature scheme, introduced by Chaum and van Heyst [1] , allows group members to anonymously sign messages on behalf of the group. In the case of a later dispute, the tracing manager can open a signature and identify the original signer. Group signatures have many applications where user anonymity is required such as anonymous credential systems [2] , identity escrow [3] , voting and bidding [4] , and electronic cash systems [5] . The motivation for an ID-based cryptosystem, originally proposed by Shamir [6] , is to authenticate messages without the need of exchanging public keys. A major advantage of an ID-based signature is that it allows one to sign a message in such a way that any user can verify the signature using the signer's identifier information such as email address instead of using his/her digital certificate.
An ID-based group signature is a combination of these two concepts. Many group signature schemes [2] [3] [4] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] have been proposed so far. Some of them [16] [17] [18] [19] are IDbased. The scheme in [16] is inefficient since the length of group public keys and signatures linearly grew with group size and its anonymity is not guaranteed [25] . A novel ID-based group signature scheme is presented in [17] . Unfortunately, it is universally forgeable [26] and not coalition-resistant [27] . The scheme in [18] is not practical since a new pair of certificate is required for each signature. Furthermore, all of them are not truly IDbased group signature scheme in the strict sense since they have ID-based key pairs for group members only. The scheme proposed in [19] is the first truly ID-based group signature scheme, in which group managers and group members are all ID-based. However, it is not practical.
Different from the traditional way, Cheng et al. [24] provided a new method to the construction of group signature schemes. They show us a nice and practical way for converting a general signature scheme such as RSA, DSA into a group signature scheme. Using this method, based on an ID-based signature scheme from bilinear pairings given by Hess [20] , we put forward a group signature scheme where group managers and group members are all ID-based. Due to the nice constructive method and the sound properties of bilinear pairing, it is shown that our scheme is practical, efficient and has short signature length. The security analysis is also under the formal security notion of an ID-based dynamic group signature scheme. This paper is organized as follows. The model and security requirements of an ID-based group signature scheme are present in Section 2. We propose a new IDbased group signature scheme and analyze its security in Section 3. The Performance Evaluation of our scheme is shown in Section 4 and the last section is a conclusion of our paper.
II. MODEL OF ID-BASED GROUP SIGNATURES
We use the model of ID-based group signatures given in [19] . It is in fact an ID-based version of the formal model for dynamic group signatures [14] . We give a briefly description here and refer the readers to [14, 19] for more details.
A. Participants and Procedures
An ID-based group signature scheme consists of a trusted Private Key Generator (PKG) for the producing of private keys of group managers and users, an Issuer Authority (IA) for the joining of users, an Open Authority (OA) for the opening of signatures and some users that may become group members. The scheme is specified as a tuple (   ,  ,  , [14] .
B. Security Notions
We use the security notions of Correctness, Anonymity, Traceability, Non-frameability from [19] . They are only a slight modification of [14] for ID-based. These notions are formulated via some experiments in which the capabilities of an adversary are modeled by providing it access to some oracles. Readers are referred to [14, 19] for these experiments and oracles. Here is only a briefly description of these notions.
-Correctness: Correctness requires that, on the one hand, signatures generated by honest group members must be accepted by Gvf algorithm; on the other hand, the Open algorithm must be able to correctly identify the original signer from a signature generated by an honest group member. -Anonymity: Anonymity requires that anyone except OA finds it hard to recover the identity of the original signer from the group signatures. 
There exists an efficient algorithm for computing ( , ) e Q R for any ,
The following two problems in 1 G are often considered. -CDH problem: Given , ,
Both the CDH and DDH problems are generally considered to be hard in 1 G . However, the DDH problem becomes easy with the help of bilinear pairing since 
B. Hess's ID-based signature scheme
We use the ID-based signature scheme given by Hess [20] as a base scheme to construct our group signature scheme. We first give a review of this scheme. Note that it has been proven to be unforgeable against chosen message attack in the random oracle model assuming that the CDH problem is intractable.
Setup : Run by PKG to generate its master key and all the necessary common parameters of the system.
-Choose a group
where κ is a security parameter. Specify the bilinear pairing : is a multi-signature under I ID and i ID , which can be only generated by user i collaborating with OA.
D. Security Analysis
Theorem 1. The proposed scheme has the security property of correctness.
Proof. We first prove correctness of the signature. Given a signature ( , , )
on some message M generated by member i, note that 1 2
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That is to say, a valid group signature can be accepted by the Gvf algorithm.
To prove that a signature ( , , )
on M is indeed generated by user i, OA provides a proof ( , ) The following is an anonymity analysis of our scheme under the formal model [19] .
In the formal model, an adversary Α, who wants to break the anonymity, has the power to get the private key and the group membership secret key of any group member and the private key of IA. It also has the power to add group members by running the Join protocol and revoke some group members by asking OA not to provide these members signing help. It is additionally given the access to Open oracle on signatures of its choice.
Α chooses two honest group members at its will, 0 i and 1 i . It also has the power to provide any message M . Α is given a signature . That is to say, Α has solved an instance of CDH problem in 1 G . This is contradict to the fact that the CDH problem in 1 G is intractable. Thus our scheme has the security property of anonymity.
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Theorem 3. Our scheme has the security property of traceability with the assumption that the CDH problem in 1 G is intractable.
Proof. To prove the security property of traceability of our scheme in the formal model, we give an adversary Α the capability of adding or revoking group members and the capability of obtaining both the private key and the group membership secret key of any group member. Α is additionally given the access to Gsig and Open oracles. However, IA and OA here must be assumed to be honest.
Group signatures here are generated by group members cooperating with OA. The identity of the signer has been stored in 2 L by OA at the time it provided him signing help. Thus the traceability here means that an adversary cannot generate a valid group signature without the help of OA.
If Α can forge a signature here are in fact (2, 2) threshold signatures produced by group members and OA. It is shown in [23] that, even if group members are corrupted, the signatures are still unforgeable since the private share of OA is unknown to the adversary. The above discussion tells us that our group signature is traceable if the CDH problem in 1 G is intractable. Theorem 4. Our scheme has the security property of non-frameability if the CDH problem in 1 G is intractable. Proof. To prove the non-frameability of our scheme, we give an adversary Α very strong attack capabilities, including the capability to corrupt IA and OA, which means that Α is not only given the private key of IA, but also allowed to access to the storage list of OA. Α is also given the capability of adding or revoking group members. The only unknown of Α is the private keys of the honest group members.
The non-frameability in our scheme means that an adversary cannot generate a valid group signature on behalf of an honest group member.
Given a signature ( , , )
on some message M generated by an honest member i , where 1 2
The adversary Α can easily generate 1 Π and 3 Π since it has corrupted IA and OA. However, 2 Π is a signature on M under identity i ID . It has been shown in [20] that such a signature is unforgeable if CDH problem in 1 G is intractable. Therefore, none except user i can collaborate with OA to generate a valid group signature that OA can trace back to i . That is to say, our scheme has the security property of non-frameability.
V. COMPARISON
Compared with previous group signature schemes, our scheme not only is truly ID-based (that is, IA , OA and group members are all ID-based), but also has some additional functions described as follows.
-Concurrent join, fast revocation and easy tracing.
It is very easy in our scheme to join a group for a user and to revoke the membership of a member for the manager. Joining of users can be done concurrently at any time. The group membership of a member can be immediately revoked at any time if OA does not provide him signing help. To trace a signature, OA needs only store the identity of the signer at the time it provides him signing help. -Trapdoor-free. Our scheme satisfies the property of trapdoor-free. Trapdoor-free means that none of the parties in the system including the group manager needs to know the trapdoor. The system trapdoor is only used during the initialization to generate system parameters. The advantage of this property is that the same trapdoor information can be used to initiate different groups. There are only two trapdoor-free group signature schemes [3, 8] so far. -Signature length. We compare the signature length of our scheme with that of BBS scheme [6] and NS scheme [8] .BBS scheme is the shortest group signature scheme so far and NS scheme is an efficient trapdoorfree group signature scheme. They are both from bilinear pairing. Assumed that all of these schemes are implemented using elliptic curves over a finite field q Z , where q is about a 170-bit prime, 1 G is a subgroup of an elliptic curve group over q Z , elements in 1 G are 171-bit strings. 2 G is a subgroup of q Z , whose size is about 1020 2 . A possible choice for these parameters can be found in [14, 15] . A signature in BBS scheme comprises six elements of q Z and three elements of 1 G . A signature in NS scheme comprises 8 elements of q Z and 10 elements of 1 G . In contrast, the signature in our scheme comprises only three elements of 1 G . The signature length in our scheme is approximately one third and one sixth of that in BBS scheme and NS scheme, respectively. The result is summarized in Table I . -Computational complexity. We also estimate the computational cost of our scheme and that of BBS scheme and NS scheme by the number of scalar multiplications and element additions in 1 G , and the number of pairing operations required for Gsig and Gvf , since these are the most costly computations. We summarize the result in Tabe II, where "# SMul" , "# EAdd" and "# Pairing" are abbreviations of "the number of scalar multiplications in 1 G ", "the number of element additions in 1 G " and "the number of pairing operations", respectively. L ) are also controlled by OA. Therefore, OA must be fully trusted in our scheme.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
By using a new method, we have constructed a truly ID-based group signature scheme, in which IA, OA and group members are all ID-based. It has the advantages of concurrent join, fast revocation, easy tracing, short length of signature and trapdoor-free. A drawback of our scheme is that OA must be online and the signature is finished by a cooperation of OA with group members.
